Können die Banken ihre Kreditsicherheit "vergessen"?
Matthias and Schmidt, Reinhard H.
Bankkosten und Bankpreise im Massengeschäft
Zur Umkehrung des Greshamschen Gesetzes bei Entflationierung des Geldes
Kompendium der Geld- und Währungspolitik für die Praxis (Gerhard Zweig)
Timing-Problem am Aktienmarkt. Ein Vergleich von Strategien der Random Walk Hypothese, der Formelanlageplanung und der technischen Aktienanalyse (Johannes Welcker)
Duwendag, Dieter und Siebert, Horst (Hrsg.)
Politik und Markt. Wirtschaftspolitische Probleme des nächsten Jahrzehnts. Hans Karl Schneider zum 60. Geburtstag (Heiko Körner)
Die Bestimmungsgründe der Zentralbankgeldbeschaffung und der freien Liquiditätsreserven der Kreditinstitute (Michael Burchardt)
Lindbeck, Assar (Hrsg.)
Inflation and Employment in Open Economics (Werner Lachmann)
Can the Banks "Forget" their Credit Collaterals?
In their well-known paper "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty and Credit Rationing", Jaffee and Russell have shown that on a credit and loan market where lenders have only imperfect information concerning repayment of their loans the amount advanced to a borrower at a given interest rate is smaller than the amount sought at that interest rate (credit rationing). Jaffee and Russell arrive at this conclusion by introducing for the borrower certain costs of insolvency, which are taken into account in their model as an exogenously given, constant amount.
Building up on this credit rationing approach, this article examines how a rise in the costs of insolvency of the borrower by the furnishing of collateral affects the credit offer of the bank. It is found that the increased costs of insolvency for the borrower by furnishing collateral reduces the uncertainty of the bank with respect to repayment; ceteris paribus, therefore, the bank will be able to grant more credit at the same interest rate to a borrower who provides collateral than to one who does not provide such collateral. This result shows, however, that the banks cannot "forget" their credit collaterals.
und Schmidt, Reinhard H.
Costs and Prices for Payment Transfer Services
In this article, a novel argument is advanced to indicate that costs are important für rational pricing policies. It is shown that the conflict between direct costing and full costing which is generally assumed in the literature, particularly in the banking literature, can be resolved.
The first half of the article analyses the new pricing policy for payment transfer services introduced by the Dresdner Bank in April 1980. This bank has been the first German bank to charge different prices for different payment services to its customers who cannot negotiate prices. The new schedule seems, at first sight, to be motivated by full-cost considerations. It is demonstrated, however, that it can also be considered as an interesting, convincing, and novel application of the idea of direct costing. The arguments developed for the case study of the Dresdner Bank's new pricing policy are discussed and generalized in the second half of the paper.
Costs are important for rational pricing policies because prices induce customers' reactions which, in turn, determine the costs of banks. Therefore prices should be set taking cost consequences into account. When banks (and other firms) are forced by their position in the market or by the nature of their output or service to make general (or standing) offers which customers can choose to accept or reject, but cannot negotiate, the relevant costs are not the costs of the individual (payment transfer) service, but rather of the total of services demanded by the customers on the basis of the set price. This fact resolves the conflict between direct costing and full costing- Direct costs have to be considered; but they are direct costs not for the individual service but for the general offer. Very often, the cost effect of any specific kind of (payment) service depend on the availability and the prices of other comparable services offered by the same supplier. Therefore, cross product effects have to be taken into account : The prices for all payment transfer) services have to be set jointly such that the intended reduction of costs, due to the reactions of all customers to all relevant prices, can be achieved.
On the lnfluence of Modern Monetary Theory on American Monetary Policy
The first part deals with the question of how the American Federal Reserve System receives, develops and elaborates new theories on monetary policy. The inclination of the Federal Reserve to recognize new theories and base its action on them is limited by the fact that it is not entirely independent of the president and Congress and orients itself to some degree to its own power and prestige objectives. The pursuance of these latter interests finds expression in avoidance of conflicts with strong social groups and institutions in efforts to preserve its scope for monetary action, and in endeavours to avoid clear formulations of goals and confession of its own mistakes.
The second part first outlines the most important theories relevant to monetary policy - monetarism, Keynesianism, the theory of rational expectations, and the conception of money market stabilization long advocated by the Federal Reserve. A description of the most recent change in the monetary policy concept of the Federal Reserve follows. The conclusion drawn is that the Federal Reserve has to some extent come closer to monetarism - as compared with former years - but still adopts a "middle-of-the-road" position that is acceptable for both "mild" Keynesianism and "mild" monetarism.
On the Reversal of Gresham's Law in the Case of Denationalization of Money
Proceeding from the pervertibility of a monopoly currency, F. A. von Hayek has proposed that private banks, too, should be permitted to issue money; he anticipates that the competition mechanism would drive out qualitatively bad (inflationary) money (anti-Gresham law). The section of this article dealing with doctrinal history adduces evidence that even Nicolas Oresmius described the phenomenon of Gresham´s Law, i. e. where forms of money have different commodity values but the same nominal value, the better money will disappear from circulation; furthermore, he also made the more important discovery that international trade in an inferior currency declines. The theoretical part examines the thesis of "barometric inflation leadership" in the case of oligopolistically structured money production. lt is argued that where uncertainty prevails on account of the enormous depreciation of the capital in which trust is placed or on account of the high gains where a high product quality is maintained, neither inflationary vanguard action on the part of an individual issuing bank nor inflationary action in convoy is probable. This view is confirmed on incorporating the financial market theory of the exchange rate in von Hayek's world of bank freedom.
Domestic Credit Expansion, Confidence and the Foreign Exchange Market: Sterling in 1976