Rudolph,
Bernd
Können die Banken
ihre Kreditsicherheit "vergessen"?
Lehmann,
Matthias and Schmidt, Reinhard H.
Bankkosten
und Bankpreise im Massengeschäft
Mayer,
Thomas
Der
Einfluà der modernen Geldtheorie auf die amerikanische Geldpolitik
Starbatty,
Joachim
Zur
Umkehrung des Greshamschen Gesetzes bei Entflationierung des Geldes
Oberhauser, Alois
Der
Charakter der frei verfügbaren Liquiditätsreserven
Tavlas, George
Economic Policy Effectiveness in Hicksian
Analysis: A Reply
Â
Cobham, David
Domestic Credit Expansion, Confidence and the
Foreign Exchange Market: Sterling in 1976
Trésor, Bodo
Kompendium der Geld- und Währungspolitik für die Praxis (Gerhard Zweig)
Nagler, Friedrich
Timing-Problem am Aktienmarkt. Ein Vergleich von Strategien der Random
Walk Hypothese, der Formelanlageplanung und der technischen Aktienanalyse
(Johannes Welcker)
Duwendag, Dieter und Siebert, Horst (Hrsg.)
Politik und Markt. Wirtschaftspolitische Probleme des nächsten Jahrzehnts. Hans
Karl Schneider zum 60. Geburtstag (Heiko Körner)
Hartmann, Manfred
Die Bestimmungsgründe der Zentralbankgeldbeschaffung und der freien
Liquiditätsreserven der Kreditinstitute (Michael Burchardt)
Lindbeck, Assar (Hrsg.)
Inflation and Employment in
Open Economics (Werner Lachmann)
Rudolph,
Bernd
âCan the Banks
"Forget" their Credit Collaterals?â
In their well-known
paper "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty and Credit Rationing",
Jaffee and Russell have shown that on a credit and loan market where lenders
have only imperfect information concerning repayment of their loans the amount
advanced to a borrower at a given interest rate is smaller than the amount
sought at that interest rate (credit rationing). Jaffee and Russell arrive at
this conclusion by introducing for the borrower certain costs of insolvency,
which are taken into account in their model as an exogenously given, constant
amount.
Building up on this
credit rationing approach, this article examines how a rise in the costs of
insolvency of the borrower by the furnishing of collateral affects the credit
offer of the bank. It is found that the increased costs of insolvency for the
borrower by furnishing collateral reduces the uncertainty of the bank with
respect to repayment; ceteris paribus, therefore, the bank will be able to grant
more credit at the same interest rate to a borrower who provides collateral
than to one who does not provide such collateral. This result shows, however,
that the banks cannot "forget" their credit collaterals.
Lehmann, Matthias
und Schmidt, Reinhard H.
âCosts and Prices for Payment Transfer Servicesâ
In this article, a novel argument is advanced to indicate that costs are
important für rational pricing policies. It is shown that the conflict between
direct costing and full costing which is generally assumed in the literature,
particularly in the banking literature, can be resolved.
The first half of the article analyses the new pricing policy for
payment transfer services introduced by the Dresdner Bank in April 1980. This
bank has been the first German bank to charge different prices for different
payment services to its customers who cannot negotiate prices. The new schedule
seems, at first sight, to be motivated by full-cost considerations. It is
demonstrated, however, that it can also be considered as an interesting,
convincing, and novel application of the idea of direct costing. The arguments
developed for the case study of the Dresdner Bank's new pricing policy are
discussed and generalized in the second half of the paper.
Costs are important for rational pricing policies because prices induce
customers' reactions which, in turn, determine the costs of banks. Therefore
prices should be set taking cost consequences into account. When banks (and
other firms) are forced by their position in the market or by the nature of
their output or service to make general (or standing) offers which customers
can choose to accept or reject, but cannot negotiate, the relevant costs are
not the costs of the individual (payment transfer) service, but rather of the
total of services demanded by the customers on the basis of the set price. This
fact resolves the conflict between direct costing and full costing- Direct
costs have to be considered; but they are direct costs not for the individual
service but for the general offer. Very often, the cost effect of any specific
kind of (payment) service depend on the availability and the prices of other
comparable services offered by the same supplier. Therefore, cross product
effects have to be taken into account : The prices for all payment transfer)
services have to be set jointly such that the intended reduction of costs, due
to the reactions of all customers to all relevant prices, can be achieved.
Mayer, Thomas
âOn the lnfluence of
Modern Monetary Theory on American Monetary Policyâ
The first part deals
with the question of how the American Federal Reserve System receives, develops
and elaborates new theories on monetary policy. The inclination of the Federal
Reserve to recognize new theories and base its action on them is limited by the
fact that it is not entirely independent of the president and Congress and
orients itself to some degree to its own power and prestige objectives. The
pursuance of these latter interests finds expression in avoidance of conflicts
with strong social groups and institutions in efforts to preserve its scope for
monetary action, and in endeavours to avoid clear formulations of goals and
confession of its own mistakes.
The second part
first outlines the most important theories relevant to monetary policy -
monetarism, Keynesianism, the theory of rational expectations, and the
conception of money market stabilization long advocated by the Federal Reserve.
A description of the most recent change in the monetary policy concept of the
Federal Reserve follows. The conclusion drawn is that the Federal Reserve has
to some extent come closer to monetarism - as compared with former years - but
still adopts a "middle-of-the-road" position that is acceptable for
both "mild" Keynesianism and "mild" monetarism.
Starbatty, Joachim
âOn the Reversal of Gresham's Law in the Case of
Denationalization of Moneyâ
Proceeding from the pervertibility of a monopoly
currency, F. A. von Hayek has proposed that private banks, too, should be
permitted to issue money; he anticipates that the competition mechanism would
drive out qualitatively bad (inflationary) money (anti-Gresham law). The
section of this article dealing with doctrinal history adduces evidence that
even Nicolas Oresmius described the phenomenon of Gresham´s Law, i. e. where
forms of money have different commodity values but the same nominal value, the
better money will disappear from circulation; furthermore, he also made the
more important discovery that international trade in an inferior currency
declines. The theoretical part examines the thesis of "barometric
inflation leadership" in the case of oligopolistically structured money
production. lt is argued that where uncertainty prevails on account of the
enormous depreciation of the capital in which trust is placed or on account of
the high gains where a high product quality is maintained, neither inflationary
vanguard action on the part of an individual issuing bank nor inflationary
action in convoy is probable. This view is confirmed on incorporating the
financial market theory of the exchange rate in von Hayek's world of bank
freedom.
Oberhauser, Alois
âThe Character of Freely Disposable Liquidity Reservesâ
For the banking system as a whole, freely disposable liquidity reserves
are a sort of factor of production to which recourse is taken to the extent
that central bank money is needed. Depending on the institutional circumstances,
the central bank can control or influence the price or quantity of that
potential factor of production. The money market performs an adjusting function
among the banks.
From the macroeconomic standpoint, the free liquidity reserves
definitely have a sort of reserve or buffer function. Therein lie their
advantages and disadvantages. Their very existance permits elastic adjustment
of the quantity of central bank money to demand. At the same time, however,
this deprives the central bank of any direct control of the supply of central
bank money.
The individual banks, however, do not have to depend on such liquidity
reserves or buffer stocks. Consequently, the free liquidity reserves cannot be
deduced from the reserve behaviour of the individual banks. Furthermore, it is
also impossible to explain possible borrowing as a portfolio decision of the
individual banks. The microeconomic approaches cannot provide a satisfactory
explanation.
Tavlas, George
âEconomic Policy Effectiveness in Hicksian Analysis: A Replyâ
It has previously been demonstrated that in a positively-sloped IS-curve
system, the less the interest sensitivity of the demand for money, the greater
is the speed of adjustment to exogenous shocks. This notes argues that there is
a limit as to how verticle the LM curve can become for stability to obtain in
the model under consideration. Specifically, that limit is set by the
requirement that the interest elasticity of the demand for money must not be
greater than the difference by which the marginal propensity to spend exceeds
unity.
Reports
Cobham, David
âDomestic Credit Expansion,
Confidence and the Foreign Exchange Market: Sterling in 1976â
This paper examines in detail the reasons for the wide fluctuations in
the sterling exchange rate during 1976, fluctuations which can be argued to
have had lasting and significant effects on the course of the UK economy. Three
possible explanations, emphasising movements in the current account, prior
monetary growth rates and prior movements in relative price levels, are
rejected as inaccurate and oversimple. The 'established' interpretation of the
episode is then set out within the framework of the monetary approach to the
balance of payments; this interpretation emphasises the importance and relative
autonomy of fluctuations in confidence, in both the foreign exchange and the
government securities markets, and implies 'reverse causation' from the balance
of payments/exchange rate via confidence to domestic credit expansion (DCE).
Some criticisms of this interpretation in the literature are discussed, and the
thinking underlying the behaviour of the monetary authorities is examined in
some detail: in particular the authorities are shown to have taken an
essentially passive view of their own monetary policy, to have focussed an
money supply growth rather than DCE and to have attached great importance to
announcement effects and other factors affecting confidence. An alternative
interpretation is then developed which regards confidence as determined, except
in the very short run, by monetary policy (DCE) and which views causation as
going primarily from DCE to the balance of payments/exchange rate. The
difficulties involved in tests to discriminate between these two
interpretations are discussed and it is argued that no definite conclusion can
be drawn. However it is concluded that future sterling fluctuations can be
prevented by the appropriate control of DCE, and that monetary policy should
therefore focus on this aggregate rather than on the growth of the money
supply. Finally the role of some political factors in the episode is considered
in an Appendix.