Das magische FÃ¼nfeck und die Trade-off Analyse
Monissen, Hans G.
Analyse der Keynesianischen LiquiditÃ¤tsprÃ¤ferenzfunktion
Das SchuldnerkÃ¼ndigungsrecht in AnleihevertrÃ¤gen
Neumann, Manfred J. M.
Konstanzer Seminar on Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy 1970
Kartsaklis, Georg A. B.
Theoretische Untersuchungen zum mikro- und makroÃ¶konomischen Kreditangebot
VermÃ¶gensumverteilung bei schleichender Inflation
Scammell, W. M.
The London Discount Market
(Manfred J. M. Neumann)
Theorie und Praxis des finanzpolitischen Interventionismus
Walters, Allan A.
Money in Boom and Slump â An Empirical Inquiry into British Experience since the 1880s
(Manfred J. M. Neumann)
âThe Magic Polygon and the Trade-Off-Analysisâ
For the economic policy of most countries, the magic polygon seems to be regarded as the desirable leitmotif. But do economic policy measures actually pursue such objectives and what weight do they assign to them? Questions of this nature resulted in the Anglo-American countries, and more recently also in Austria, in studies on the possible objective functions of monetary policy. They are based on preliminary work on the compatibility of objectives and the relative cost of their attainment and on the choice of suitable indicators which permit measurement of the direction and intensity of economic policy activity. This present study is of interest primarily because of its successful investigation of these preliminary questions. It discloses great differences in the "state of the science". The question as to how far price stability and squaring of the balance of payments are independent and reasonable objectives of economic policy is still controversical. The mutual compatibility of objectives and the relative cost of attaining an objective at the expense of less complete attainment of another have been tolerably well investigated econometrically. So far, however, there has been scarcely any attempt to measure the economic cost (as opposed to costs in the form of less complete attainment of some other objective). The great difficulty, however, lies in examination of the question of what combination of objectives economic policy actually pursued in the past. Neither the objectives nor the direction and intensity of economic policy are susceptible of direct measurement; studies have to depend on indicators. And even the pertinent terminology has hardly been developed. This study suggests making a distinction between secondary objective indicators that show the objectives of economic policy and indicators of requirements, intentions and success that show the requirements, intentions and success of economic policy measures. In view of the terminological confusion, the results of the first econometric studies in this field are not strictly comparable. They seem to indicate, however, that at least monetary policy does not pursue a fixed bundle of objectives, but in each case pays special attention to objectives which are especially jeopardized. But it is probably not rigourously proven it places too much emphasis on price stability - if it is at all possible to call this an independent objective.
Monissen, Hans G.
âAnalysis of the Keynesian Liquidity Preference Functionâ
In general, the behaviour of the Keynesian liquidity preference function, which embraces an infinitely elastic domain, i. e. the so-called liquidity trap, is either postulated ad hoc or substantiated by reference to a quite specific mode of portfolio behaviour oriented solely to the expected value of the current rate of return per period. It can be shown that this portfolio behaviour, which is generally accepted as constitutive for the shape of the macro relation, does not legitimate the expected result. This, in turn, not only leads to an incorrect interpretation of the Keynesian demand function for money, but also to false conclusions as to the effect of various monetary policy measures of the central monetary authorities. As long as the number of existing securities is not zero, the equilibrium rate of interest will always lie above the critical minimum rate at which nobody is willing to invest in securities. Making allowance for the overall economic budget restriction, the demand function for money approaches the abscissa asymptotically; an infinitely elastic domain of the function cannot be derived from the underlying behaviour assumptions. Both the demand function for money and the corresponding demand function for securities include the arguments not only of the current and expected rates of interest, but also the amount and structure of the total wealth. Over and above that, the specific behaviour assumptions lead to a pronounced sensitivity of macro relations to changes in the microstructure, which in particular render approximatively consistent aggregation extremely difficult. If we take account of the wealth dependence of macro relations and of the mentioned structural characteristics, it is possible to derive a spectrum of monetary policy measures of varying effect, which modifies and extends the traditional Keynesian policy approach in various ways.
âThe Call Provision in Loan Agreementsâ
Nearly all loan agreements give the debtor Call Provision but the investor's call risk varies, depending on the terms of loans and the categories of the debtors. The call risk of new issues grows as the nominal interest increases. For this reason, the possible premature redemption of loans is at present a very topical problem. Experience during the Sixties indicates that, for example, mortage banks begin to serve notice of termination of their usually "longmaturity" loans as soon as there is an interest gap of only 1/2 %, i. e. as soon as the market rate is only 1/2% below the nominal interest. This "conversion-warranting interest difference" is dependent on several variables. Apart from the costs accruing in the event of a conversion, the residual term and the amount of the tax burden on the issuer determine a loan's "maturity for conversion". The conversion maturity of a security can be established unequivocally by actuarial methods. With the aid of suitable formulae the issuer can calculate the benefit of a possible conversion and the investor can draw conclusions as to the issuer's possible modes of behaviour.
Neumann, Manfred J. M.
âKonstanzer Seminar on Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy 1970â
This is a report on an international symposium on monetary theory, the hosts of which were Karl Brunner and the team of the monetary theory and monetary policy research project in the Economic Sciences Department of the University of Constance. The basic idea of the future annual Constance Seminars on Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy is to induce the monetary theory debate in Germany and other European countries to emerge from its restricted national ambit and to intensify the direct dialogue among European and American monetary theorists and members of monetary policy agencies. At the same time, it is intended to stimulate interest in the study of European monetary processes. At the 1970 conference nine papers were read, the contents of which are outlined this report. One notable aspect is that the proceedings were concentrated on two main themes; on the one hand the theoretical conception of monetarism and its consequences for monetary policy (papers by L. C. Andersen, K. Brunner/ A. H. Melzer), and on the other the analysis of German monetary policy (papers by H. Irmler, M. J. M. Neumann, J. Siebke, M. Willms).