The Debate About Monetarist Policy Recommendations
Dewald, William G. and Lai, Tsung-Hui
Factors Affecting Monetary Growth: ARIMA Forecasts of Monetary Base and Multiplier
Realzins, Inflation und makroÃ¶konomisches Gleichgewicht
Moosa, Suleman, A.
Stock Market Growth Expectations, Risk Perceptions, and Ex-Ante Returns Under Uncertain Stagflation
Auswahl- und Kontrollprobleme bei Venture-Finanzierungen
Die Geldnachfrage in sozialistischen Planwirtschaften: Polen 1950 - 1984
Ertragsorientiertes Bankmanagement â ein Lehrbuch zum Controlling in Kreditinstituten
(Hans J. KrÃ¼mmel)
Monopolkommission: Gesamtwirtschaftliche Chancen und Risiken wachsender UnternehmensgrÃ¶Ãen â Hauptgutachten VI
Internationale WÃ¤hrungspolitik im sozialistischen Staat. Theoretische Grundlegung und empirische ÃberprÃ¼fung am Beispiel der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
(Georg J. Dobrovolny)
Haushaltsfinanzierung durch Notendruck
(Klaus Dieter Diller)
McKenzie, Richard and Tullock, Gordon
Homo oeconomicus. Ãkonomische Dimensionen des Alltags
âThe Debate About Monetarist Policy Recommendationsâ
The dispute between Keynesians and monetarists about monetary policy has failed to focus on a central issue, the Keynesian's political assumption that the central bank can be trusted to operate efficiently and in the public interest. This underlies disagreements about the use of only a single target variable, the use of the monetary growth-rate as that variable, and the desirability of a stable monetary growth rate. If one grants the Keynesian political assumption, then Keynesian policy recommendations are highly plausible, if one reject it, then the monetarist ones are. While monetarists have repeatedly stated their distrust of the central bank, Keynesians have ignored this part of the monetarist case. This would be justified only if the Keynesian political assumption were obviously correct. But this is not the case, due to political pressures, the central bank's self-interest and the potential for X-inefficiency. Hence, more effort should be devoted to tests of the political assumption.
Dewald, William G. und Lai, Tsung-Hui
âFactors Affecting Monetary Growth: ARIMA Forecasts of Monetary Base and Multiplierâ
This paper uses the technique of autoregressive integrated moving averages to forecast the money multiplier and noncontrolled factors that affect the monetary base in the United States. These forecasts in turn are used to forecast the M1 money stock. Previous analysis along these lines has assumed that the monetary base was autonomous. The present analysis reveals that the Federal Reserve could have hit its Ml growth targets with less than one percent error on the assumption that the Federal Reserve forecasts both the monetary multiplier and noncontrolled sources of Variation in the monetary base. In the present study, the M1 multiplier is forecast monthly and the noncontrolled sources of the monetary base weekly from which monthly average forecasts are derived. The conclusion is that observed failures to control monetary growth as targeted in the United States reflect unwillingness not inability to do so. Though control of only the M1 Aggregate is examined in the present paper, this conclusion would be all the more applicable to broader Aggregates, the added components of which are generally more stable and predictable than components of M1.
âReal Interest, Inflation and Macroeconomic Equilibriumâ
The distribution of the effects of persistent inflationary impulses on real and nominal interest rate levels is a matter of dispute in monetary policy. It is possible to prove, within the framework of two common macroeconomic assumptions, both the super-neutrality-of-money prognosis - in this case the real rates of interest remain unchanged - and the expansionary-growth-impulse prognosis - in this case the real interest rates decline. Steindl attempted to prove in this publication (1985) that both standard assumptions do not stand a fundamental equilibrium theory test, because they seem to contradict the Walrasian law. This contribution, by contrast, shows that both standard assumptions are nonetheless compatible with Walras' law when interpreted as special border-line cases of this law. Furthermore, the solution Steindl proposes, which is based on the static Pigou effect, is rejected as untenable in terms of transmission theory: There is no transmission requirement with perfect price flexibility and, thus, no property effect. Instead, a variant of the macroeconomic system is presented, which takes account of the Walrasian law in a general manner covering the two results ordinarily obtained, as border-line cases. In the last analysis, super-neutrality of inflation is the ease only in the absence of stocks of interest-bearing public-sector papers. If, on the other hand, such stocks of public-sector papers do exist, the inflationary impulse takes the form of rising nominal and falling real rates of interest. However, there is room for an element of relativity in this result itself, because the implications of the real inflation tax for the public sector's budget dynamism have been left unconsidered.
Moosa, Suleman, A.
âStock Market Growth Expectations, Risk Perceptions, and Ex-Ante Returns Under Uncertain Stagflationâ
The empirical issues addressed in this study are centered around the estimate of a statistically significant strong negative relationship between inflation and shareholder earnings growth expectations, and around the estimate of a statistically significant negative coefficient of less than unity of the dividend yield on shareholder earnings growth expectations. The latter implies that these increases in inflation non-neutral growth expectations produced fractional increases in equity capitalization rates, thus tending to dampen growth-induced fluctuations in common stock prices. A simultaneous examination of the nature of the empirical relation between monetary growth, inflation and earnings growth on the one hand, and of the stochastic nature of their respective time series on the other, provides us with some insights into the likely nature of the process influencing inflation, interest rate, and earnings growth expectations, as well as that shaping risk perceptions and capitalization rates. If increases in monetary growth are perceived to produce, with some lag, increases in earnings growth, as well as increases in the inflation rate with an even further lag, then the Fisher effect implies an increase in market interest rates and equity capitalization rates. The combination of our findings of inflation-related declines in real earnings growth and of growth-related fractional declines in real equity yields provides us with a rational explanation for the depressed state of the stock market over the post1955 period of generally accelerating inflation. The policy implication that emerges from our analysis is that non-inflationary economic policies also have to be more stable. Such policies can be expected to reduce the inflation-induced changes in risk premia and its associated negative real effects, thereby increasing equity values and stimulating capital formation.
âSelection and Control Problems in Venture Financingâ
Financing young ventures as distinct from established successful ones presupposes a much more comprehensive assessment of their overall entrepreneurial and managerial concepts. Innovative projects often require risk assessments credit institutions are unable to make since they do not have the necessary analyzing potential and know how. Divergent information of investors and capital donors on the proposed investments' earnings capacity and risks in the venture area may result in the rationing of funds either through or independent of the price. The eventual form of fund rationing depends on the risk pattern in the market for venture financing. By contrast, capital donors' risk aversion plays an only minor role in the limitation of venture financing. If both the investor and the capital donor is informed equally well, all investments are financed and implemented at terms adequate to the risks involved, although the financier is strongly risk-opposed. After the decision to finance a venture has been taken, the capital donor must ensure that the venture actually develops as provided for upon the conclusion of the contract and does not become riskier from this point of view. Collaterals to secure loans young ventures can, as a rule, not provide as necessary. Capital donors, in order to avoid financing business concepts running counter to their interests, require ample information and far-reaching approval rights assigned to them under the financing contracts they sign. Also, such contracts must limit incentives to behave in ways detrimental from their points of view as much as possible. Contracts of this nature are, as a rule, concluded in the ease of capital investments. Equity capital has proved to be a useful venture-financing instrument in those cases in which capital donors must take account of decisions subsequently taken by investors to their detriment, but in which adequate collaterals cannot be provided.
âMoney Demand in Socialist Planned Economies: Poland 1950 - 1984â
The few analyses hitherto available on the demand for money in Socialist planned economies cover historical periods for the most part. In some cases they also include specifications that conform to the factual requirements of these economic systems to a certain extent only. The present analysis attempts to take account of both aspects. The definition of a general money-demand function for the private sector and its theoretical basis are followed by the empirical specification; for the available statistical data available for Socialist planned economies requires even more interpretation and processing compared with the market economies. The concluding empirical study shows on the basis of the Polish example that modern monetary policy instruments â after the requisite institutional adaptation â allows system-indifferent applications. The results obtained confirm the assumed validity of the model, which â in addition to the known variables â provides for governmental rationing as an influencing factor and suggests a stable money demand function.