Nautz, Dieter and Wolters, Jürgen
Die Entwicklung langfristiger Kreditzinssätze: Eine empirische Analyse
Spahn, Heinz-Peter
Glaubwürdigkeit, Zeitinkonsistenz und Zinsdifferenzen in einem System fester Wechselkurse
Dewachter, Hans
Measuring Exchange Rate Smoothness across Regimes
Schmid, Frank A.
Banken, Aktionärsstruktur und Unternehmenssteuerung (Teil II)
Bester, Helmut and Scheepens, P. J. F.
Internal Finance versus Bank Debt: The Gains from Establishing a Debt History
Hasche-PreuÃe, Christine
Stripping von Bundesanleihen oder die Direktemission von Zerobonds
Jakobs, Wolfgang and Schröder, Jürgen
Optimales Hedging (Kurssicherung) im AuÃenhandel
Marquardt, Ralf-Michael
Vom Europäischen Währungssystem zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
(Silvia Marengo)
Nuck, Stefan W.
Zur ökonomischen Theorie geldpolitischer Institutionen. Alternative theoretische Analysemöglichkeiten institutionellen Wandels in der Geldordnung - dargestellt am Beispiel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wolfgang Kerber)
Rudolph, Bernd
Derivative Finanzinstrumente (Thomas Ebertz)
Nautz, Dieter and Wolters, Jürgen
"The Development of Long-Term Credit Rates: An Empirical Analysis"
This paper investigates the development of five-year and ten-year mortgage loan and capital market rates. Cointegration tests imply that these interest rates are separated by maturity: each mortgage loan rate is cointegrated with its refinancing rate, i.e. the capital market rate with the same maturity. Whereas the relation between two interest rates of different maturities which is implied by the expectations hypothesis of the term structure seems to be weak. However, impulse response functions and a dynamic factor analysis reveal that there are nevertheless level relations between interest rates of different maturity. It is demonstrated that the consideration of these more complex relations improves the forecast of the five-year mortgage loan rate.
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Spahn, Heinz-Peter
"Credibility, Time Inconsistency and Interest Rate Differences in a Fixed Exchange Rate System"
The Barro-Gordon model can be applied to an open economy. If the welfare function of the economic policy agent exhibits a preference for the target of employment, the promise to keep a fixed exchange rate is not credible as a devaluation enhances employment in case of lagging exchange rate expectations. In anticipation of a cheating of a national policy makers devaluation expectations emerge causing interest differences between financial assets denominated in different currencies. Accordingly, economic policy has to choose between two unfavourable alternatives: to defend the fixed exchange rate by means of high interest rates causing employment losses or to execute an already expected devaluation aggravating the risk of inflation. Interest Rate differences and currency crisis in the EMS can be conceived as partly failed attempts to base economic and monetary policies on long-term targets and commitments.
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Dewachter, Hans
"Measuring Exchange Rate Smoothness across Regimes"
This paper proposes a framework to analyse the smoothness of exchange rates across regimes and applies this framework to the ERM rates both quoted against the Deutsche mark and the French franc. It is found that the traditional conclusion that semi-fixed exchange rate regimes decrease the smoothness crucially depends on whether one analyses Deutsche mark rates or French franc rates.
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Schmid, Frank A.
"Banks, Shareholder Structure and Corporate Control (Part II)"
This study investigates the impact of shareholder structure on firm performance. Two samples of German stock corporations are analyzed. It can be shown that equity positions of banks have a positive impact on firm performance in 1974. In 1985, however, no impact of banks can be identified that goes beyond the positive influence of nonblank blockholders. The hypothesis is rejected that there has been no structural change between these two periods. An analysis of the banks' supervisory board representation contradicts Edwards and Fischer (1994). These authors claim that the banks' proxy voting does not translate into board seats held by banks.
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Bester, Helmut and Scheepens, P. J. F.
"Internal Finance versus Bank Debt: The Gains from Establishing a Debt History"
This paper considers a two-period model in which a firm needs outside financing in period 2. If a firm establishes a reputation with a bank already in the first period, it may reduce the cost and increase the availability of bank debt in the second period. To establish such a reputation, the firm must induce the bank to monitor in period 1. Bank monitoring effort is non-contradictable, so the firm induces the bank to monitor by taking an unsecured bank loan. In period 1 a bank loan may then be preferable to internal finance. This contrasts with a result by Myers and Majluf (1984) where firms always prefer to finance profitable investments internally.
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