Fand, David J.
Ein monetaristisches Modell des Geldwirkungsprozesses
Interne und externe Stabilität
Die Schichtenbilanz als Instrument der Leistungsanalyse für die Kreditbank
Della Porta, Glauco
Organisation der Kreditmarktfinanzierung in Italien
Bühler, W. (Hrsg.)
Die Kreditdisposition der Banken
Ferber, M. (Hrsg.)
Pensionsgeschäfte der Kreditinstitute
Die Schuldenpolitik der Länder
Bankbetriebliches Wachstum Funktionalzusammenhänge und Operations Research in Kreditinstituten
(Paul Helmut Schmitz)
Fand, David J.
A Monetarist Model of the Monetary Process
This paper assesses the Monetarists' model of money, emphasizing those analytical aspects which differentiate it from the Fiscalists' monetary model. Although these two models are sometimes categorized in terms of money matters" or 'only money matters", this mnemonic classification does not highlight the analytical distinctiveness of their respective monetary theories. To obtain a better understanding of the Monetarists' model we also need to distinguish the money veil of theory and the extremely potent, and highpowered, money of stabilization policy, and between nominal money and the real money stock. The monetary model (Quantity theory) of the Monetarists incorporates a theory of money, prices and interest rates that differs substantially from the liquidity preference analysis of interest rates of the Fiscalists. Monetarists have a monetary theory of the price level, a non-monetary theory of the (real)interest rate, and a theory relating rising (or high) market rates (nominal interest rates) to rising prices: they postulate, following Fisher, a sequence leading from monetary expansion to rising prices and high market rates; they distinguish, therefore, between rising rates and high rates, and between market rates and real (interest) rates; and they rationalize a rise in market rates (relative to real rates) by introducing a price expectation variable in their model to capture the impact of rising prices on nominal interest rates. The Fiscalists, in contrast, have a monetary theory of the interest rate, a non-monetary theory of the price level, and do not distinguish either between rising and high rates or between nominal and real rates- they assume that high (or rising) market rates reflect corresponding changes in real rates; and they associate the variability of market rates with volatility in real rates. The implication concerning the instability of the real economy is, in this sense, related to this particular analytical framework. The Monetarists, view of fiscal Policy may also be somewhat misunderstood, because it is closely tied to the manner in which they calibrate and measure the posture of monetary policy. An action defined by Fiscalists as one of fiscal stimulus may also be defined by Monetarists as one of monetary stimulus, so that clear-cut discriminating tests of the two theories are not readily available. Thus, it is only when movements in the money stock and in the full-employment surplus go in opposite directions - as in 1966 and in 1968 - that we get any real tests of their relative effects. The Monetarist advocacy of stable monetary growth does not necessarily imply that discretionary fiscal policy actions have no short run aggregate demand effects. It is sufficient for Monetarists to argue that the effects of temporary budgetary changes are uncertain, that they have long and variable lags, that they are not superior (and may be inferior) to monetary actions in terms of effectiveness, and that budgetary changes should be instituted primarily for their important allocative effects. The post-1968 experiences, and the discovery that some fiscal effects may also be subject to a lag, should serve to reopen theoretical and policy discussions of the relative roles of Monetary and Fiscal policy in stabilization.
Internal and External Stability - A critical appraisal of proposals by R. A. Mundell and W. Stuetzel
This article ventilates proposals by Mundell and Stuetzel who recommend that, in overall economic situations in which objectives of internal and external stability conflict with each other within the framework of the prevailing international economic system, the instruments of economic policy should be split up. Fiscal policy should be expansive (contractive) to attain full employment coupled with monetary stability, while monetary policy - simultaneously contractive (expansive) - should serve to square the balance of payments. It proves, however, that the investigated proposals cannot - as intended -solve the dilemma with which many countries are faced in trying to achieve internal and external economic goals simultaneously without sacrificing the priority of one of the goals or having to veer off the course of the existing international monetary system. A consideration of the three levels on which the means applied may conflict, with each other in achieving objectives (mutual impairment in application, ineffectiveness and, finally, in consequence of the degree of attainment of goals) shows that the splitting up of economic policy instruments can constitute a solution - though to different extents according to the two authors - at best for the first two. Experience will show that if economic policy achieves one of the conflicting objectives, it will render attainment of the other more difficult, despite the splitting up of economic policy instruments.
The Stratified Balance Sheet as an Instrument of Efficiency Analysis for Credit Banks
For bank cost accounting, the allocation problem is something of a brain twister. As such, in fact, it has attained a certain degree of notoriety; and not only because on getting down to the essentials - i.e. the question of whether any perceptible connection can be established between credit assets and liabilities - we encounter the most widely diverging views on the character of a credit-granting institution. Indeed, the solution of this problem is sometimes regarded as the decisive prerequisite for price calculations in the credit business. It seems as if probability theory - perhaps in conjunction with the methods of behaviour research - might actually permit a better insight. In the event of an investigation producing favourable results, there would be no further need for resignation in the future. The consequences would be of considerable import, not only for credit policy. Above -all, the stratified balance sheet would attain importance for internal costing and simultaneously for dispositions. It would no longer be solely an instrument for interest cost accounting. It would become a decision-making aid for the management of the institute, because it would show the scissor movement of maturity transformation and willingness to pay, and the reciprocity of profitableness and liquidity. To this end it will be necessary to stratify not retrospectively, but from day to day on the basis of the daily statement. Daily stratification will be necessary because substantial changes in outstanding credits may also alter the decision-making situation considerably.
Della Porta, Glauco
Organization of Credit Market Financing in Italy
The first section of this contribution deals with short-term credit and is introduced by a survey of the most important legal regulations and the instruments of the central bank (Banca d' Italia). Then the functions and peculiarities of the banks under public law, the supra regional private banks, the joint-stock and savings banks, and their respective central institutions are described successively. In the second section, following a detailed presentation of the statutory regulations governing medium and long term credit business, the organisation of investment financing is described. Special consideration is given here to the financing problems of small and medium-sized firms. In particular, distinctions are made between the credit institutions according to their regional activity, the size of the borrowers and the degree of specialization.