Ramb, Fred
Verschuldensstrukturen im Vergleich - Eine Analyse europäischer Unternehmen
Rösl, Gerhard and Schäfer, Wolf
A Conceptual Approach to the Creation and Allocation of Central Bank Profits in the Euro Area
Bikker, Jacob A. and Groeneveld, Johannes M.
Competition and Concentration in the EU Banking Industry
Breuer, Wolfgang
Hedging und Reputationsaufbau auf Terminmärkten
Burkhardt, Thomas and Lohmann, Karl
Banking and Electronic Commerce im Internet (Hermann Meyer zu Selhausen)
Wolgast, Michael
Deviseneigenhandel der Geschäftsbanken, Devisenspekulation und nichtfundamentale Wechselkursbewegungen (Beate Reszat)
Wohlschieß, Volker
Unternehmensfinanzierung bei asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung (Hellmuth Milde)
Ramb, Fred
"Comparing Debt Structures - A Study of European Enterprises"
Thirty years after the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller and countless articles the capital structure puzzle is for the most part unsolved. Especially, in this field of research there is a considerable lack of empirical evidence. Using firm level data from seven European countries, this paper tries to analyze differences in the determinants of leverage due to legal form. For the most countries, including Germany, France, Spain, and the Netherlands, legal form exerts only a slight impact on the determinants of capital structure. In contrast, only in the UK and Italy there are considerable effects of legal form on financing patterns. Taken together, earlier empirical evidence for stock market firms seems to hold for other legal forms.
top
Rösl, Gerhard and Schäfer, Wolf
" A Conceptual Approach to the Creation and Allocation of Central Bank Profits in the Euro Area "
The conceptual approach to the allocation of monetary competence within the Euro area leads to a tripartite system concerning the creation of central bank net profits: it is divided into an ECB-, NCB-ESCB-specific and NCB-ESCB-independent component. The expected amount of the ECB-net gain is rather limited due to the ECB's lack of operational activities. Furthermore it is unlikely that any noteworthy redistribution effects will occur. But the same does not hold for a considerable proportion of NCBs' net gains. According to Art. 32.2 of the ECB/ESCB Statute, the monetary net income of the NCBs are to be pooled and - in terms of our basic concept - have to be interpreted as ESCB-specific net profits generated by the NCBs. They are recorded following the deadline-earmarking-procedure. Resulting unwelcome redistribution effects might not be entirely avoidable, but they can be restricted by applying a suitable procedure. The analysis of the NCBESCB-independent component enquires into the scope for monetary policies left to NCBs even after entering the monetary union. This proportion of NCB-ESCB-independent net profits should be recorded separately and stay with each NCB, respectively. (JEL E50, E58, E59)
top
Bikker, Jacob A. and Groeneveld, Johannes M.
"Competition and Concentration in the EU Banking Industry"
This paper presents empirical evidence on the competitive structure in the banking industry in the EU as a whole as well as in individual EU countries. The study is based on the Panzar-Rosse methodology, which uses a non-structural estimation technique to evaluate the elasticity of total interest revenues with respect to changes in banks' input prices. The significant positive values of the competitiveness measure indicate that banks do not exhibit monopoly behaviour in any of the EU countries. Rather, European banking sectors operate under conditions -monopolistic competition, albeit to varying degrees. The results also provide some support for the conventional view that concentration impairs competitiveness.
(JEL D41 - 43, 1316, G15, G18, G21)
top
Breuer, Wolfgang
"Hedging and Reputation Building in Forward Markets"
The present contribution examines the conditions under which entrepreneurial activities, not noticeable in general, may generate positive welfare effects for the economy as a whole in spite of the existence of potential risk incentive problems and the assumption of general risk neutrality. It would be fair to presume that, in order to prevent their creditworthiness from being ranked lower by potential capital donors as a consequence of insolvency, companies show themselves to be interested in making, wherever possible, hedging transactions in contexts of several periods to reduce for themselves the probability of becoming insolvent. The incentive to a company to build a reputation for itself tends to be stronger in standardised futures markets inter alia than in forward markets where the terms and conditions of contract can be shaped individually. It ought to be mentioned for practical reasons that the present contribution justifies the approach of aligning entrepreneurial risk management measures to a - criterion with representing the value of the in-payment surpluses expected to remain after satisfaction of creditors (in a single period), whilst stands for the individual insolvency risk of companies.
top