Maier, Philipp and Hendrikx, Maarten
Implications of EMU Enlargement for European Monetary Policy: A Political View
Bikker, Jacob A.
Testing for Imperfect Competition on EU Deposit and Loan Markets with Bresnahan's Market Power Model
Poddig, Thorsten and Laudi, Peter and Varmaz, Armin
Betriebsgrößen- und Fusionseffekte bei Kreditgenossenschaften
Löffler, Gunter
What is at Stake when Determining Lifetime Asset Allocation?
Münchbach, Dominik
Management der operationellen Risiken des Private Banking (Heino Betz)
Maier, Philipp and Hendrikx, Maarten
"Implications of EMU Enlargement for European Monetary Policy: A Political View"
In this paper we investigate the implications of EMU enlargement from a apolitical economy perspective. We argue that a high degree of convergence of the candidate countries prior to EMU accession is an important requisite. Otherwise, as a result of a sharp increase in economic dispersion, public support for European monetary policy is likely to decrease, and external pressure on the European Central Bank will mount. (JEL E 58, E 50, D 78)
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Bikker, Jacob A.
"Testing for Imperfect Competition on EU Deposit and Loan Markets with Bresnahan’s Market Power Model"
Bresnahan and Lau developed a model of profit maximising oligopoly banks in order to determine the degree of market power of the average bank. The equilibrium price equation includes a mark up, which is not used at all under perfect competition, partly used under oligopoly or monopolistic competition and fully used under monopoly. The data requirements of the model allow testing of possible use of market power of submarkets. This article investigates the degree of competition on both the deposit and loan markets in nine EU countries, both apart and jointly. The hypothesis of perfect competition can be rejected for the deposit market of the "entire" EU, for the deposit markets of Germany and Spain and for the lending markets of Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Nevertheless, these markets are characterised as highly competitive, because the use or abuse of market power is very limited. ( JEL E 43, E 51, F 36, G 21, L 1)
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Poddig, Thorsten and Laudi, Peter and Varmaz, Armin
"Size and Merger Effects on Cooperative Banks""
Proceeding from theoretical considerations, this article analyses the effects of mergers and corporate size on the balance sheet ratios of cooperative banks. This empirical study is based on a sample of a total of 731 annual financial statements of cooperative banks and on the 50 mergers included in these statements covering the period 1990/2000. The results of the analysis show that the existence of significant differences between merged and non- merged cooperative banks could not be proved. On the other hand, corporate size effects do in fact exist. It would thus be fair to conclude that larger credit co- operatives record advantages concerning the administrative costs cannot do more than offset the financial and liquidity disadvantages they experience. Obvious, by contrast, is especially the deterioration in their own capital ratio.
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Löffler, Gunter
"What is at Stake when Determining Lifetime Asset Allocation?"
This paper examines the effects of deviating from the optimal life- cycle asset allocation. The likely magnitude of sub- optimality is gauged through an analysis of differences between available life- cycle funds. The motivation is that due to search costs, the complexity of the decision problem and other factors, investors may not choose the asset allocation profile best suited to them. The associated utility losses are quantified using a model of lifetime consumption and portfolio choice. The results suggest that these utility losses are modest. In many cases, they are smaller than the loss which arises if the return on financial assets is reduced by 0,3% per annum. The analysis helps to identify the most important decisions when saving for retirement, and to balance the costs and benefit of customising saving products. (JEL D 91, G 11)
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